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Summary
Bosnia and Herzegovina is a small and open economy in transition with great 
distrust in local authorities and institutions. The country applies a currency board 
as the only acceptable and optimal exchange rate system in order to protect its mon-
etary policy from political influences. The strict rules of the currency board provide 
monetary stability and confidence in the domestic currency, but disable the pursuit 
of discretionary monetary policy and limit autonomous fiscal policy for the purpose 
of stimulating an investment cycle and economic development without coordinated 
accompanying support of monetary policy.
The subject of this paper is an analysis of the short-term and long-term effects of 
the currency board application in Bosnia and Herzegovina in conditions of increas-
ing liberalization through the process of European integration. Given the negative 
consequences and limitations of the currency board system, this paper analyses in 
particular the possibility of introducing a central bank with discretionary monetary 
policy instruments, as well as other measures that can influence the overvaluation 
of the domestic currency exchange rate.
The scientific methods used in the paper are: inductive-deductive method, de-
scriptive method and statistical method. The conclusion and recommendations are 
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obtained by using inductive-deductive method and descriptions of current economic 
trends based on numerous secondary statistical data presented in the tables and 
charts.
Key words: currency board, (un)real exchange rate, devaluation vs. deflation, 
internal adjustment, Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Резиме
Босна и Херцеговина је мала и отворена економија у транзицији, с ве-
ликим неповјерењем у домаћу власт и институције, те примјењује валут-
ни одбор као једини прихватљив и оптимални систем девизног курса, како 
би се монетарна политика заштитила од политичких утицаја. Строга 
правила валутног одбора осигуравају монетарну стабилност и повјерење у 
домаћу валуту, али онемогућују вођење дискреционе монетарне политике и 
ограничавају аутономну фискалну политику у циљу бржег инвестицијског 
циклуса и економског развоја, без координиране пратеће монетарне поли-
тике. 
Предмет овог рада јесте анализа краткорочних и дугорочних ефеката 
примјене валутног одбора у Босни и Херцеговини у условима све веће либера-
лизације кроз процес европског интегрисања. С обзиром на негативне посље-
дице и ограничења валутног одбора, у раду се посебно анализира могућност 
увођења класичне централне банке с дискрецијским инструментима моне-
тарне политике и друге мјере којима се може утицати на превладавање 
прецијењености курса домаће валуте. 
Кључне ријечи: валутни одбор, (не)реалан девизни курс, девалвација, де-
флација, интерно прилагођавање, Босна и Херцеговина.
Introduction
A currency board was developed by the colonial policy in 19th century with the 
aim of limiting the economic development of less developed countries (colonies) 
and preventing them from becoming competitive. In modern times, transitional 
countries autonomously introduce a currency board, which serves as a starting 
point for maintaining monetary stability and creating a development strategy in 
the world of global competition. It is a system in which the domestic currency 
is only issued if fully covered with the reserve currency and if it is possible to 
substitute it in unlimited amount and at any time for the reserve currency at the 
fixed exchange rate. In addition, the rules of a currency board prohibit lending of 
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a “central bank” to any sector of the economy (the state, banks, enterprises and 
population), as well as performing any transactions on the money and capital 
markets. The currency board system allows a country with great political and 
economic problems to rapidly introduce its own currency, create the confidence 
of all entities in the domestic currency, stabilise prices and the banking system. 
A currency board was introduced in Bosnia and Herzegovina as the best so-
lution for the Central Bank to distance itself from the political influence on the 
creation of money circulation. The strict rules of the currency board imposing 
restrictions on both monetary and fiscal policy2, enabled, in the short-term, the 
acceptance of the domestic currency BAM (convertible mark) throughout Bos-
nia and Herzegovina, the price stabilisation and the financial (banking) sector 
development in the country. But, analysing the determinants of long-term ex-
change rate movements (international competitiveness, labour productivity, pro-
tectionism, consumer preference, etc.), it can be concluded that in conditions of 
fluctuations in foreign exchange rates, BAM would surely deprecate (Mishkin, 
2010, pp. 437-438). In all reports of the World Economic Forum on international 
competitiveness, BiH has been ranked behind all its most important foreign trade 
partners3. Bosnia and Herzegovina is significantly legging behind the EU mem-
ber states, and its productivity was at the level of 31% of the EU average in 20154. 
This is a consequence of low technological capability, weak economy of individ-
ual economic entities and a lack of an institutional framework for entrepreneur-
ship promotion. In addition, huge administration and costs (fiscal and parafiscal) 
imposed by the state on the economy/society as a whole are the reason for low 
productivity and uncompetitive nature of the BiH economy. 
Very low labour productivity in BiH, consumer preferences in favour of for-
eign goods5 and excessive liberalization in the context of European integration 
(CEFTA, Stabilization and Association Agreement) have a long-term impact on 
the depreciation of the domestic currency. But, given the long-term implementa-
tion of the currency board and the fixed exchange rate, it is clear that the “con-
vertible mark” is nominally overvalued currency. From the stability instrument, 
2 Since a currency board prohibits lending to the state from the primary emission, public spending 
can be financed exclusively from taxes, contributions and instruments of commercial borrowing.
3 According to the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report for 2016-2017, which 
includes 138 countries, BiH is ranked as 107th, Serbia as 90th, Croatia as 74th, Macedonia as 68th, 
Slovenia as 56th, etc. (Retrieved on 21 January 2017, from https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-
global-competitiveness-report-2016-2017-1)
4 Source: Federal Institute for Development Programming, Labour Productivity in BiH – a Condi-
tion for Strengthening Competitiveness, Sarajevo, April 2016, p. 6; www.fzzpr.gov.ba/
5 The impact of ethnocentrism in BiH is very strong, because domestic population, such as Serbs 
and Croats, consider products from neighbouring countries (Serbia and Croatia) domestic, and 
therefore prefer their consumption to the products produced in BiH. This, of course, affects the 
movement of imports and exports in foreign trade.
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the exchange rate has turned into an instrument for limiting economic growth. 
This is the result of an irresponsible overall economic policy, especially fiscal pol-
icy, which, due to high public spending, imposes high taxes and prevents greater 
productivity. Direct consequences of non-competitiveness, liberalization, the 
currency board policies and the overvalued domestic currency are continuous 
and high foreign trade deficit, external debt growth, low production, unemploy-
ment and de-industrialization. 
Due to the restrictions, the domestic currency in the currency board system 
does not have the function of stimulating investment cycles in the long term, but 
serves only as transactional asset. Instruments for encouraging economic devel-
opment should be sought within other economic policy measures. A currency 
board can only be positive in the short term, because it allows price stability. In 
the long run, a currency board disables economic development in transitional 
countries, due to the overvalued exchange rate, unless other measures of eco-
nomic policy and structural reforms are taken to prevent it. The replacement of a 
currency board with the introduction of a classical central bank requires a num-
ber of economic preconditions, for which small, open and import-dependent 
economies have very little chance. In the case of BiH, this also implies many other 
non-economic conditions (political pressures, corruption, etc.) as well as the eco-
nomically efficient and rational behaviour of the state. Until that happens, the 
currency board serves as a barrier to an even more costly behaviour of the state.
The initial intention was to have a currency board for up to 6 years. However, 
the currency board has still been applied since the establishment of the Central 
Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1997. It is the longest case of the currency 
board implementation in history.
1 Consequences of the currency board implementation and the 
overvalued currency 
The economic policy in BiH is based on neoclassical theory or monetarism, 
known as the Washington Consensus, whose settings are also contained in the 
IMF arrangements. The essence of functioning of the BiH economy can be ex-
plained within the framework imposed by the rules of the currency board, EU 
accession and the level of economic development.
Due to the low level of competitiveness, labour productivity and liberalization 
of foreign trade in the context of European integration, BiH has long-standing, 
high foreign trade deficits that dominate the structure of its balance of payments. 
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Table 1:
Foreign trade in goods (in thousands of euro)
Year: Volume of trade Export Import Balance
Coverage rate of 
imports by exports %
2006 8,463.456 2,640.463 5,822.993 3,182.531 45.3
2007 10,141.385 3,035.327 7,106.058 -4,070.731 42.7
2008 11,761.864 3,431.633 8,330.231 -4,898.599 41.2
2009 9,145.160 2,828.057 6,317.103 -3,489.046 44.8
2010 10,589.745 3,627.873 6,961.872 -3,333.999 52.1
2011 12,142.311 4,203.925 7,938.386 -3,734.461 53.0
2012 11,816.662 4,017.905 7,798.757 -3,780.852 51.5
2013 12,041.266 4,284.880 7,756.386 -3,471.506 55.2
2014 12,721.464 4,438.904 8,282.559 -3,843.655 53.6
2015 12,700.070 4,595.141 8,104.929 -3,509.788 56.7
Source: Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Longstanding high trade deficits are a direct consequence of the low in-
ternational competitiveness of BiH and the excessive liberalization of foreign 
trade.6Although commodity deficits are partially covered by the surplus of the 
foreign trade in services and transfers as the most significant surplus item in the 
country’s balance of payments, current account deficits are still high. Also, the 
share of foreign direct investment in the coverage of the current account deficit 
is very low. This is a consequence of the complex organization of the country and 
excessive administration, which results in high taxes that reduce domestic invest-
ment potential and create insufficiently stimulating environment for the inflow 
of foreign investment. The final consequence is the growth of external debt as the 
most important source of financing the current account deficit. 
Table 2:
Trends in external debt of Bosnia and Herzegovina
External debt of the 
government sector 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
In millions of BAM 4,240 5,236 6,291 6,663 7,212 7,563 8,442 8,691
In percentages of GDP 16.6 21.1 24.8 25.4 27.5 28.3 30.9 30.9
Source: Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annual Report 2015, p. 111
6 BiH has recorded a slight growth in export-import coverage in recent years. The main reason for 
the trends in exports and imports is business cycles in the international market, rather than “major 
reforms” and economic policy of BiH. For example, in times of financial crisis and the global reces-
sion of 2007 and 2008, the foreign trade deficit increased, and then decreased as a result of over-
coming the recession in the EU and stimulating measures of the ECB. In BiH export, base metals 
and their products (aluminium and steel), whose value is increasing due to the price growth in the 
international market and other low value added goods, have had the largest share in BiH export. On 
the other side, imports are dominated by consumer goods, while there is less capital goods.
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When a state or banks borrow in foreign currencies abroad, they have to con-
vert the foreign currency into the domestic currency issued by the central bank, 
thus creating the primary money that can be further multiplied into deposit 
money. All budgets (state and entities) are predominantly consumer-social, and 
banks are dominant in providing consumer credits. Therefore, the primary emis-
sion of money does not go into production, but the final consumption which is 
settled from the foreign trade deficit. The foreign trade deficit must be financed 
in the foreign currency purchased from the central bank. In this way, in most 
cases previously emitted money is withdrawn. So, the current account deficit is 
financed from the purchase of the foreign currency from the central bank. This 
withdraws domestic currency previously issued by the foreign currency purchase 
from foreign borrowing. The results of this process are stable prices, overvalued 
currency, very low production and employment, with the constant rise in the 
foreign debt.
The currency board creates an illusion of price stability and confidence of 
foreign investors. Namely, prices are stable as there is no depreciation and import 
inflation due to legislative provisions of the currency board (fixed nominal ex-
change rate), and domestic producers cannot increase prices because of foreign 
competition, as this would increase the overvaluation of the domestic currency. 
Therefore, we are talking about administrative, rather than market price stability.
Foreign debt and foreign transfers still maintain a sufficient level of foreign 
exchange reserves and the money supply and create an illusion of financial stabil-
ity.
Table 3:
Trends in foreign exchange reserves of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Gross foreign exchange 
reserves 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
In millions of BAM 6,296 6,212 6,458 6,424 6,509 7,068 7,826 8,606
In millions of US dollars 4,710 4,416 4,372 4,569 4,274 4,797 5,309 4,883
Source: Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annual Report 2015, p. 111
Social peace and financial stability will be maintained as long as it is possible 
to borrow abroad. When the borrowing limit is reached, all higher foreign debt 
repayments in the future will become key constraints to financial sustainability. 
Long-term functioning of the economy on the principles of the currency board 
in the future will be possible until foreign exchange reserves and the money sup-
ply begin to decline significantly. When this happens, the government will have 
to sell state-owned enterprises and natural resources, completely lose its econom-
ic sovereignty and go into bankrupt in economic terms.
15
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2 Is Bosnia and Herzegovina over-indebted?
When assessing the burden of BiH external debt, apart from economic charac-
teristics, one should bear in mind the poor demographic characteristics of the 
population (emigration of the young population, the change in age structure of 
the population, adverse relations of employees/pensioners, etc.). However, the 
sustainability of the external debt will mostly be determined by the economic 
development level of the country. The two the most important indicators of in-
debtedness indices (External Solvency Indicators), used by the World Bank, are 
the ratio of external debt/GDP and the ration of external debt/exports of goods 
and services. 
The ratio of external debt/GDP indicates the risk of a country’s insolvency. 
According to the World Bank, the increase in the external debt/GDP ratio above 
30% indicates a relatively high risk of future insolvency of the country. Bosnia 
and Herzegovina has a steady deterioration in the external debt/GDP ratio and 
has reached the defined nominal limit (29.08% by the production method of 
measuring GDP or 27.62% by the expenditure method of measuring GDP).7 This 
is a consequence of long-term and large current account deficits, and low rates of 
economic growth,8 even lower than interest rates on borrowed loans.9 However, 
the real situation is much more difficult. Due to the overvaluation of the domestic 
currency, this indicator is not realistic, because the external debt denominated 
in the foreign currency is undervalued, and GDP measured in the domestic cur-
rency is overvalued. If the real foreign exchange rate was used, then the actual, 
considerably higher foreign indebtedness for the amount of overvaluation of 
the domestic currency would be seen. Secondly, it is very important to consider 
not only quantitative but also qualitative side of GDP. The structure of the BiH 
economy has significantly changed from the dominant industrial to the domi-
nant service economy. This is partly a result of the war destruction and poorly 
conducted privatization, as well as poor economic policies (large non-production 
public spending, high fiscal burdens and overvalued exchange rate). Comparing 
the structure of employment by sectors before and after the war, it can be seen 
that both the number and the structure of employees are constantly deteriorating.
7 Source: Ministry of Finance and Treasury, Information on the State Debt of Bosnia and Herze-
govina on 30.6.2016, p. 15
8 Real GDP growth rates (in %) were: 2.77 (2015); 1.05 (2014); 2.4 (2013); -0.9 (2012); 0.9 (2011); 
0.8 (2010); -2.9 (2009), etc.; Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina - Annual Report 2015, p. 112
9 The average weighted interest rate is 1.6% on the total debt, 1.4% on the external debt and 2.9 
% on the internal debt. Source: Mid-Term Debt Management Strategy of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Ministry of Finance and Treasury of BiH, March 2016, p. 7
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Table 4:
Total number and the structure of employees in BiH
Sector: 1990 2008 2016
Total % Total % Total %
Agriculture 19,392 1.9 183,000 20.6 144,000 18.0
Industry 856,232 83.4 289,000 32.5 251,000 31.3
Services 150,630 14.7 418,000 47.0 407,000 50.8
Total 1,026,254 100.0 890,000 100.0 801,000 100.0
Source: Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina (http://www.bhas.ba/tematskibilteni/)
A decrease in industrial production, which primarily creates export potential, 
and expansion of the service sector reduce the overall economic capacity of the 
country and the ability to repay the foreign debt. For example, in the analysis of 
public indebtedness of the Euro-zone countries, Italy, which is highly indebted 
but an industrialized country, is considered to be less risky than Greece or Portu-
gal, which are less industrially developed, i.e. tourism as the most sensitive eco-
nomic sector is much more represented in the structure of their GDP.10
Another indicator, the ratio of external debt/export of goods and services 
shows the indebtedness of the country per unit of goods and services. It is a good 
indicator of the current debt repayment capacity, as export represents the source 
of funds for the external debt repayment. The ratio of external debt/exports of 
goods and services is more stable indicator than the ratio of external debt/GDP, 
as it is not affected by the change in the real exchange rate. The ratio of exter-
nal debt/exports of goods and services was 85.84% in 2015.11 This is not a high 
amount because the creditworthiness of the country becomes questionable when 
the ratio exceeds 200%, i.e. when the external debt exceeds twice the value of an-
nual export of goods and services. But, this applies to economies with a classic 
central bank that can manipulate the exchange rate and interest rate in order to 
encourage exports and investment.12 This indicator should be considered criti-
cal at a significantly lower level for a de-industrialized economy with a currency 
board, precisely because of the lack of discretionary monetary policy and poor 
10 The indebtedness of the EU countries in 2015 was (measured as the public debt/GDP): Greece 
177.4%, 132.3%, Italy, Portugal 129%, etc. 
(http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Government_finance_statistics)
11 The ratio of external debt/export will increase significantly in 2017, 2018 and 2019, due to repay-
ments to the IMF based on the IV Stand-by Arrangement; Source: Mid-Term Debt Management 
Strategy of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ministry of Finance and Treasury of BiH, March 2016, p. 8
12 This problem is also evident in the Eurozone countries that have come into the debt crisis (e.g. 
Greece, Portugal). However, the policy of solidarity and EU funds allow Eurozone members much 
easier to overcome the debt crisis, than they would for BiH that is not the member of the EU and 
the EMU, nor does it have a discretionary monetary policy.
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export capacity that would provide foreign exchange earnings for the external 
debt repayment.
Among the external debt flow indicators, it is important to consider the ratio 
of debt repayment/export of goods and services. If this ratio is less than 10%, it is 
considered that the country is not at a risk of insolvency, and if it exceeds 20%, it 
is considered to be a high risk of insolvency for the country. Foreign debt servic-
ing of BiH has not been a big problem so far, but in the coming years, due to the 
obligations under the IV Stand-by Arrangement, this ratio will exceed 10% which 
can be a problem, especially because of the limitations of the currency board.13
3 Currency board – winners and losers
The currency board, with low labour productivity and liberalized foreign trade, 
has created overvaluation of the domestic currency. The overvaluation of the do-
mestic currency has the same effect for domestic, export-oriented producers as 
the linear introduction of export duties on everything that is exported or subsi-
dies for foreign companies that export to our country for the amount of overvalu-
ation. All export-oriented enterprises that produce domestically have costs (sala-
ries, material costs, taxes and social contributions, etc.) in domestic overvalued 
currency, while revenues are generated by exports abroad in undervalued foreign 
currencies. Therefore, the biggest losers, due to the overvaluation of the domestic 
currency, are domestic export-oriented companies, which are uncompetitive on 
the international as well as on the domestic market, as domestic consumers buy 
cheaper imported goods. In this way, the overvalued domestic currency encour-
ages the process of economic de-industrialization, bankruptcy of the company 
and very high unemployment. For these reasons, banks, as the most developed 
sector of the economy, mainly provide loans for final consumption of the popu-
lation that is settled by import, while lending to the economy is insufficient and 
unprofitable. 
Unlike the industry, which has gone through a huge digression, the service 
sector, primarily banking and trade, has experienced prosperity. Trade has de-
veloped because it is profitable to buy and import foreign goods in undervalued 
foreign currencies and sell them domestically in overvalued domestic currency. 
Anyone who appears on the demand side of the foreign market and on the sup-
ply side of the domestic market, benefits from an overvalued domestic currency. 
That is why a number of shopping malls, mainly in foreign ownership, have been 
developed aimed at selling foreign goods. In addition, the imported goods are 
13 In September 2016, the IMF approved a three-year Extended Credit Facility of EUR 553.3 mil-
lion with an interest rate of 1.05%, a grace period of four and a half years and a repayment period 
of ten years. Funds will also be used for repayment of previously taken loans.
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intended for final consumption rather than for investments. All this has contrib-
uted to long-term and high foreign trade deficits.
The overvalued domestic currency is also favoured by the banking sector and 
its development. Privatized and predominantly foreign-owned banking sector 
places available funds in consumer loans for the purchase of imported goods 
rather than investment loans for domestic production. The banking sector in BiH 
borrows in foreign undervalued currencies (e.g. in the euro) and realizes interest 
revenue in the overvalued domestic currency (in convertible mark) at relatively 
high interest rates.14 Thus, the banking sector is one of the most profitable sectors, 
while the BiH economy is in a chronic recession.
Both the trade and banking sector in BiH are in the function of the foreign 
trade deficit, external indebtedness and poverty of the domestic population. 
Therefore, the banking and trade sectors are predominantly foreign-owned, be-
cause, in conditions of overvalued domestic currency, they are the most profit-
able businesses for foreign direct investment. Foreign capital has been more used 
through take-over investment in the tertiary sector (banks, trade, etc.) that is 
more profitable compared to green-field and brown-field investments in the real 
sector (industry) which a small and open economy should be based on. All em-
ployees whose salaries are administratively, and not market determined benefit 
from the overvalued currency. Due to the reduction in the industrial sector there 
is less production and more interest in the services sector (banks, trade and the 
public sector), which results in greater social differences. 
Finally, the Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina can be considered a loser 
because of the currency board. As a public or state institution, the Central Bank 
has four ultimate macroeconomic goals: price stability, economic growth and de-
velopment, full employment and the balance of foreign trade. It is clear that the 
currency board has only provided the price stability at the expense of achiev-
ing three other macroeconomic goals. Essentially, the job of the Central bank 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina is reduced to the currency conversion and statistics 
management.
4 Currency Board or Classic Central Bank
Due to the limitations of the domestic market, development of a small transition 
country should be based on export-oriented production. To achieve this, it is 
necessary to guide the policy of the undervalued exchange rate of the domestic 
currency, which would enable employment of domestic factors of production, 
14 BiH has borrowed abroad at higher interest rates, due to the political and systemic risk as well as 
because of the very low credit rating of the country.
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profitable exports and all advantages of economies of scale (average cost decre-
ment, new technology and management, etc.). 
According to all economic trends (foreign trade deficit, external debt growth, 
de-industrialization, etc.), Bosnia and Herzegovina has an overvalued exchange 
rate and should take measures of a real depreciation, which will lead from over-
valuation to the undervaluation of its currency exchange rate. Theoretically, this 
is possible in three ways:
 – increase in prices in the foreign trade partners
 – nominal devaluation/depreciation of the national currency and
 – reduction in prices of domestic goods in the country (deflation).
Price stability, i.e. the preservation of the euro, is the primary monetary goal 
in the EMU. The ECB regulates the money supply and thus sets the interest rates 
for the eurozone, in order to keep inflation below, but close to 2% in the medium 
term. Price stability is the most important contribution of monetary policy for 
the economic growth and job creation which are the two main goals of the EU.15 
Given that the EU is the most important foreign trade partner for BiH, it is not 
realistic to expect that the overvaluation of the exchange rate will be reduced 
by faster price growth in foreign trade partners compared to the domestic price 
level.
BiH has a choice between two alternatives, devaluation or deflation. Both so-
lutions are risky and have negative and positive consequences.
Devaluation is only possible when a currency board is replaced with a clas-
sic central bank with discretionary monetary policy instruments. In the specific 
political and economic conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, devaluation is not 
a realistic option, because certain preconditions (full political independence and 
trust, a developed financial market and a stable banking system, etc.) have to 
be fulfilled for a classical central bank. Transformation of the currency board 
into a central bank with discretionary monetary policy instruments cannot be ef-
fectively implemented in conditions of systemic corruption, dysfunctional state, 
insufficient independence from political influences, a lack of trust in institutions 
(including the Central Bank), high openness and import dependence, currency 
substitution, only entity securities and not the state ones, etc. The majority of 
small countries (Croatia, Montenegro, etc.), especially BiH, which are burdened 
with various problems (political and legal complexity of the country, corruption, 
etc.) are simple unable to have a classical central bank with discretionary mon-
etary policy instruments.
15 The best way for long-term price stability is moderate inflation of up to 2%, which is in the func-
tion of investment and economic growth. Therefore, since March 2015, the ECB, as well as other 
major central banks before it, has launched a quantitative easing process (QE) in order to depreci-
ate the euro against the US dollar and other world currencies, reduce interest rates and stimulate 
economic growth. 
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The autonomous introduction of the euro, as it was the case in Montenegro, 
is not a solution for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Namely, the introduction of the 
common currency is justified if countries are at an equal level of development 
and competitiveness.16 For example, within the European Monetary Union, a 
certain nominal amount of the euro will actually be more valuable in countries 
with higher labour productivity (mostly old EU members) and thus undervalued, 
while in countries with lower labour productivity (mostly new EU members) the 
euro will actually be less valuable and thus overvalued.17 That is why less devel-
oped countries are increasingly borrowing and losing economic sovereignty.
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Figure 1: Labour productivity per hour (EU28 = 100) in the EU countries; 2015  
Source: Eurostat (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/refreshTableAction.do?tab-
=table&plugin=1&pcode=tesem160&language=en)
In conditions of monetary union and significant differences in labour produc-
tivity in member states or regions, liberalization of foreign trade on the principles 
of comparative advantages leads to unfair competition, even greater polarization 
to industrially developed and underdeveloped countries and social stratification. 
The European Union is decreasingly becoming the integration of economical-
ly independent countries, and increasingly becoming functional integration of 
large-scale capital of multinational corporations. In this sense, the Nobel Prize 
16 The first chief economist of the European Central Bank and one of the creators of the euro, Pro-
fessor Otmar Issing has warned that the eurozone is a “house of cards”, that euro cannot survive 
in the existing form and it as only a matter of time when it will collapse. (Retrieved on 20 January 
2017 from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/eurozone-euro-collapse-house-of-
cards-ecb-single-currency-a7364826.html)
17 Due to the high labour productivity and undervalued euro policy, Germany has steadily ex-
panded its exports and economic growth, and at the end of 2016 it reached a record of 44 million 
jobs in history.
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winner for economics in 2016, British economist Oliver Hart believes that the 
introduction of the euro was a mistake. According to him, the EU has to give up 
the trend of centralization, and he proposes partial decentralization, including 
monetary policy, i.e. the return of national central banks and national currencies. 
He believes that EU members are not sufficiently homogeneous to form a single 
entity, and that further centralization leads the EU to ruin and decentralization to 
prosperity.18 Bosnia and Herzegovina has very low labour productivity (around 
30% of the EU average). Therefore, in the case of the autonomous introduction 
of the euro, Bosnia and Herzegovina would have overvalued euro from the start, 
which would continue to affect the deterioration of the economic situation and 
the loss of economic sovereignty.
As a small and open transition country, with the de-industrialized economy 
and growing external debt and in conditions of imposed liberalization and eco-
nomic integration, BiH has minimal opportunities to apply development policy 
in a way that other developed countries did in the past (customs, quotas, mon-
etary policy, etc.). As a member of CEFTA and the country that implements the 
Stabilization and Association Agreement, BiH is not in a position to run an au-
tonomous customs policy and monetary policy with the currency board and real 
constraints. In current circumstances, BiH can only use fiscal policy measures to 
reduce domestic prices (deflation). The socio-economic and related reforms that 
are implemented through the so-called “Reform Agenda for Bosnia and Herze-
govina” and the structural adjustment measures imposed by the IMF through 
stand-by arrangements are replacing the state of lawlessness (tax evasion, cor-
ruption, etc.) and administrative economies with the rule of law and the market 
economy. 
In that sense, there are a number of internal adjustment measures:
 – harmonization of domestic legislation and standards with the European 
Union
 – reform of the public sector and reduction of costs and number of employees
 – reduction of the pay gap in the public and private sector19
 – creation of the necessary market institutions 
 – privatization of state-owned enterprises
18 The Nobel Prize-winning economist Oliver Hart argued that “the euro was a mistake” and that 
Britain has acted rightly when it did not accept the introduction of the euro. He also argued that it 
would be a good thing if Europe abandoned a single, currency in the future, i.e. euro, while keeping 
free trade and free movement of labour. (Retrieved on 19 January 2017 from http://www.euractiv.
com/section/euro-finance/news/economic-nobel-prize-winner-the-euro-was-a-mistake/)
19 The greatest difference between average salaries in public administration and the private sector 
in Europe is in BiH (57% in FBiH and 44% in RS), Romania 28%, Bulgaria 26%, Slovenia 21%, 
Serbia 19%, Latvia 16%, Croatia 10 %, etc. In Slovakia, for example, public sector wages are lower 
by 17% than in the private sector; (Retrieved on 18 January 2017 from www.cci.ba)
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 – reform of labour legislation
 – reform of the pension and health system
 – coordination of entity banking agencies and deposit insurance agencies, etc.
Public sector reform and spending cuts20 would help to reduce the private sec-
tor’s fiscal burden and create a stimulating business environment.21 This would 
not necessarily reduce the revenue of the state budget if the basis for the taxation 
of production increased. This is known from the theory of Arthur Laffer’s taxa-
tion curve. However, although the actions aimed at fiscal and financial sustain-
ability and other socio-economic reforms are necessary to create “...the rule of 
law and the fight against corruption; and to strengthen administrative capabili-
ties and increase efficiency in public institutions at all levels of government  ...”22, 
they cannot solve the problem of overvalued exchange rates and deep recession. 
Creating a more favourable business environment with lower fiscal charges and 
deflation is not enough to ensure development.23 The reduction of the fiscal bur-
den in the real sector in order to create deflation would further discourage pro-
duction and consumption and lead to an even greater recession. Deflation is a 
process that leads to bankruptcy, increases unemployment, etc. It is not the way 
competitiveness and exports are increased. Also, the policy of negative interest 
rates on deposits above the reserve requirements with the Central Bank of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina has not given positive results. Namely, due to an overvalued 
exchange rate and insufficient investment demand, commercial banks placed the 
funds mostly in treasury bills and bonds to finance budgetary non-productive 
consumption. Production and employment have not increased, but internal and 
total public debt has.
BiH must change the concept of neoclassical development (the so-called 
Washington Consensus), in which free market competition and the foreign di-
rect investment play a key role as drivers of economic development. But, such 
concept of development is appropriate for developed economies close to the state 
of full employment. Foreign direct investment, as well as EU funds, cannot be 
20 The public expenditure (in % of GDP) in BiH was 42.6 (2015), 45.8 (2014), 44.8 (2013), etc. 
Source: Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina. (Retrieved on 17 January 2017, from http://sta-
tistics.cbbh.ba:4444/Panorama/novaview/SimpleLogin_cr.aspx)
21 In that sense, within the framework of the “tax reform” in 2016, the abolition of the only incen-
tive measure in FBiH was an absurd, whereby companies that export more than 30% of their pro-
duction were exempt from paying income tax.
22 Reform Agenda for Bosnia and Herzegovina 2015 - 2018 (Retrieved on 20 January 2017, from 
http://europa.ba/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Reform-Agenda-BiH.pdf)
23 The Laffer curve and the supply economy, i.e. reduction of tax rates aimed at stimulating produc-
tion and investment in the past, was not effective in solving economic problems (budget deficits, 
inflation and unemployment) because of the low elasticity of production and investment. This was 
demonstrated by the US example, during the two mandates (1981-1989) of President Ronald Rea-
gan and in the UK during the presidency of Margaret Thatcher (1989-1990).
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the key, but only additional sources of economic growth. In the context of inter-
nal adjustments, BiH should apply Keynesian economic policies, in which public 
investment is the main measure of economic development. In a recession, when 
total aggregate demand decreases, the most effective way to encourage the over-
all economic growth is productive public expenditure (capital investment) as an 
autonomous component of aggregate demand, initiated by the state regardless 
of the national income. The state should initiate investments (especially in infra-
structure) from the part of the funds which are collected in different ways and ir-
rationally spent, thus creating projects that would be acceptable to banks as well, 
as it would be less risky. Also, the privatization of strategic public companies is 
not a solution. However, it is necessary to change the method of electing members 
of the board of directors, to choose professionals rather than political figures. The 
current government should ensure the absence of any politicization in choosing 
management in public companies (electric power companies, telecom compa-
nies, development banks, etc.), because it shows what form of management they 
want in the economy and society.24 In addition, these are companies with the 
highest creditworthiness, which can be used as collateral in issuing government 
bonds for capital investments, not for public non-productive consumption. In 
this way, Bosnia and Herzegovina, in present circumstances, should reduce the 
overvaluation of the domestic currency, so that everyone can pay the real price 
of the business. All those that were previously subsidized due to the overvalua-
tion of the domestic currency (traders, banks and employees in the public sector 
with administrative salaries) would have negative consequences of real deprecia-
tion, and all newly-employed workers and export-oriented industrial companies 
would benefit from real depreciation of the domestic currency. In the long-run, 
the reduction of overvaluation and the creation of the undervaluation of the cur-
rency will create the growth of net exports, foreign exchange revenue for repay-
ment of external debt, revenues to the state budget and new investments. Also, 
long-term economic growth is the best way to prevent inflation.
BiH is not able to lead an autonomous expansive monetary policy in order to 
encourage investments and economic development. This is justified by a number 
of economic (size and openness of the economy, import dependence, currency 
substitution and a lack of money illusions, currency speculation, etc.) and non-
economic (political influences and distrust in institutions, corruption, psycho-
24 For the purpose of better functioning of the entity development banks, a “Letter of Intent” of the 
government of BiH envisages measures such as: banking agencies should take the supervision over 
the national development banks instead of the entity governments, remuneration of board mem-
bers should be linked to the realized effects, external audit reports must be publicly available, etc. 
The aim is to prevent the affairs of the past (for example, lending to members of the supervisory 
board and employees, although the law prohibits lending to individuals, lending to favourable en-
terprises based on political and private interest criteria).
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logical influences, etc.) factors. It is realistic to assume that such a policy would 
lead to high inflation and the capital outflow from the country. If a detailed cost/
benefit analysis shows that it is not possible to introduce a classical central bank, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina can leave the currency board and autonomously intro-
duce the euro. It would be technically simple to do, but would not significantly 
resolve the economic problems. 
Discretionary monetary policy is appropriate for much larger, less open and 
politically stable economies, such as the Eurozone. In such countries, the prima-
ry emission of money (lat. ex nihilo) and direct financing of public investments 
could be an effective measure of getting out of the recession, with significant mul-
tiplicative effects without necessarily causing inflation. As long as the primary 
emission of money is covered in new production and employment, it will not 
cause inflation. In economically and politically stable countries, it is possible to 
have low inflation that stimulates investment in the long-run and maintains price 
stability through economic growth. In addition to the quantitative easing policy, it 
is necessary to create a real transmission mechanism, i.e. a national development 
bank, which will ensure that the primary money emission is invested directly, 
not through banks, in the public-infrastructure projects and new production.25 
Because “... the central banks have the power to prevent a bank or non-financial 
corporation from failing by lending it money needed to pay its workers and sup-
pliers, but they cannot oblige companies to invest or households to consume, and 
they cannot compel the economy to resume its growth” (Piketty, 2014, str. 649-
650). In the case of large and successful economies (the US, the EU, China, etc.), 
the exchange rate can become a flexible instrument of monetary policy instead of 
a fixed nominal anchor, and the role an anchor is replaced by targeted inflation 
with pre-programmed and precise devaluation in order to allow adaptation of 
market entities and prevent destabilizing speculation.
Conclusion
The currency board, as the strictest form of the exchange rate system without any 
discretionary rights in monetary policy, allows nominal stability of the exchange 
rate and prices. Monetary stability is a fundamental precondition for a transi-
tion period in which structural reforms have to be implemented. But monetary 
stability without the necessary structural reforms, for small, open and insuffi-
25 In the UK, British economist Jeremy Corbyn proposes a policy of “People’s Quantitative Eas-
ing (PQE)” by investing in public infrastructure (energy, transport) directly, rather than through 
banks. The investments would be made through the National Investment Bank set up to invest in 
new infrastructure, etc. Corbyn, J., The Economy in 2020, p. 5-6. (Retrieved on 17 January 2017, 
from http://www.solidariteetprogres.org/IMG/pdf/theeconomyin2020_jeremycorbyn-220715.
pdf)
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ciently competitive economies, is not sufficient and will not lead to real economic 
convergence. On the contrary, the process of divergence dominates the process 
of convergence, both between EU members and potential members. Structural 
and pre-accession EU funds can only mitigate this. With the entry of new mem-
ber states with insufficient levels of real economic convergence and facing unfair 
competition of multinational corporations in much more developed old mem-
bers in the free market of the EU, the EU has become increasingly less integrated 
union of politically and economically equal sovereign members, and increasingly 
more integrated market of unfair competition dominated by a large capital of 
multinational corporations.
BiH, as a small, open, deindustrialized and indebted economy with its early 
entry into the EU, will have less chance for reindustrialisation and autonomous 
management of economic development policy. BiH must undertake economic 
policy measures in order to implement real depreciation, i.e. reduce overvalu-
ation and undervaluation of the domestic currency, which would lead to the 
improvement of real economic convergence towards the EU. Therefore, BiH 
should, as soon as possible, initiate a process of major structural reforms of pub-
lic expenditure reduction and restructuring, in order to create more a favourable 
business environment for domestic and foreign investment and mobilise invest-
ments from public funds through development banks exempted from any form 
of political influence. The currency board in BiH has provided nominal stability, 
but in the long run, without the necessary structural reforms, it limits economic 
development. It is absurd in which the nominal stability of the exchange rate and 
prices is insured, the currency becomes more overvalued and production and 
employment are decreasingly lower. By implementing structural reforms, that is 
creating legality and the rule of law, providing a better business environment and 
implementing a Keynesian investment policy in the context of internal adjust-
ment, Bosnia and Herzegovina has a chance to change the negative economic 
trends. Otherwise, BiH will become increasingly de-industrialized and indebted, 
sell the most valuable state-owned enterprises and completely lose its economic 
and probably political sovereignty.
Discretionary monetary policy and a classic central bank is not an option for 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Namely, given the overall political and economic situ-
ation in BiH, it is realistic to assume that such a policy would lead to huge in-
flationary pressures as a result of the emission of money and devaluation. The 
primary money emission (known as quantitative easing – QE policy) aimed at 
depreciating the exchange rate, reducing interest rates and consequently stimu-
lating economic growth, in contemporary conditions of the globalized world, is 
the privilege of only large economies (the USA, the EU, China, Japan, etc.).
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